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THE THREE RELIGIONS.*

I AM afraid the title of this lecture is not so ethical in some respects as it ought to be. The first principle of ethics, I suppose, with regard to human speech, is that what we say (it being presupposed that what we say is worth saying at all), should be expressed in plain and intelligible language. Now, it is certainly not very clear what is to be understood by "the three religions." You will naturally ask, *Which* three? For indeed there have been almost as many religions in the world as there have been men. Perhaps in one sense there have been precisely as many. Perhaps every one of us has his own peculiar idea of what is most precious and most worthy to be pursued—his own standard of worship or worthship. What we worship is the counterpart of what we are; and hence, instead of saying that there have been three religions, there may be a sense in which it would be truer to say that there have been several millions of millions. And even if we set aside the vagaries of individual caprice, and consider only those objects of devotion by the thought of which large bodies of men have been inspired, the gods of the nations instead of the gods of individual fancy—those gods whom, as Goethe tells us, the poets have brought down among men, and to whose image the poets have, in some degree, helped mankind to rise—even if, I say, we confine our attention to such gods as these, who, in contrast with the more perishable ideals of individual minds, may not untruly be described as *immortal* gods; still, we cannot but be struck with the multiplicity of the deities whom men have worshipped, and the multiplicity of the forms in which men have worshipped them. Diversities of religion

* A lecture delivered under the auspices of the London Ethical Society, in Essex Hall, in February, 1891. After this lecture was written, I discovered that an article with a very similar title ("The Two Religions"), by Miss Frances Power Cobbe, had appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for December, 1890. The principle of division adopted in that article is the same as mine; but otherwise there is very little resemblance between the article and the lecture.

have separated race from race by a more impassable gulf than that of language or of color; they have deluged the world with blood, and roused more bitter passions than the lust of gain or glory or power, or perhaps even the thirst for liberty, could excite. Not three religions, therefore, we are inclined to say, but three thousand or three millions rather.

That is one way of looking at the matter; and it is often a profitable way. Bacon has taught us that we are always in danger of imagining more unity in the world than there is. Such a word as "Religion" satisfies our minds, and we forget that it is used to cover things as far apart as Fetichism, the Salvation Army, and the Worship of Humanity. It is right that we should recognize this danger of resting content with a label. If no two leaves in a forest are quite alike, we can hardly expect that two human heads or two human hearts will perfectly harmonize in their ideals and aspirations. Yet, after all, we are all very much alike; or, at any rate, like the leaves in the forest, our thoughts can be brought under a few main varieties. And indeed it may help us even to understand our differences more clearly if we consider for a little what are the main principles of unity that underlie them.

In dealing with this subject during the few minutes that we have at our disposal, I shall make no pretence of discovering the mode of treatment which is ultimately right or best. It will be enough if we can find some point of view from which the matter may be instructively regarded, and which shall not be altogether untrue. An attempt to do more than this would be sure to be more tedious, and would not be sure to bring us any nearer to the truth. You are to understand, then, distinctly, that what I am about to say is merely given as expressing a point of view which I trust may prove suggestive, but for which I claim no particular merit or final validity.

There is a passage in Kant which has been often quoted,—almost the only passage that ever is quoted from the works of this writer, commonly supposed to be almost supernaturally obscure,—in which he says:*

* "Critique of Practical Reason" (conclusion).

Two things fill our minds with increasing wonder and reverence, the oftener and the more closely we study them : *the starry heavens above and the moral law within*. . . . The former begins from the spot I occupy in the outer world of sense, and gives to my environment in that world an unbounded expanse, bringing me into relation with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, revolving periodically throughout an infinity of time. The latter (the moral law), on the other hand, begins from my inner self, my personality, and places me in relation to a world which is in a deeper sense infinite, but which is discoverable only by thought, and with which I perceive that my connection is not merely contingent, but universal and necessary. . . . The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an *animal creature*, which, after life has been for a short time breathed into it, one knows not how, has to give back the matter of which it was made to the planet it inhabits (itself a mere speck in the universe of being). The second view, on the contrary, elevates my worth as an intelligence in an infinite degree, by means of my personality, wherein the moral law sets before me a life that is not dependent on my animal nature, or indeed on the sensible world at all; since that law imposes on me a mission which is not conditioned by the limits of this life, but is in a true sense infinite.

These, then, are the two things that seemed to Kant most worthy of reverence—the infinity of nature and the infinity of the moral ideal. Now, it seems to me that there is a true and instructive sense in which it may be maintained that these are also the two things that mankind in general have found worthy of reverence—these two separately, or else some combination of the two. The worship of these two separately, therefore, and the worship of them in combination, may be said to be the three great religions of the world. At any rate, rightly or wrongly, it is this view of religion that (for lack of a better) I wish to illustrate to-night.

Perhaps the contrast between these three forms of worship could not be better brought out than by a comparison of what we may call the two cultured or sophisticated religions with the one popular religion which we find among ourselves at the present moment. The popular religion is, of course, Christianity; while by the cultured or sophisticated religions I mean Agnosticism and the Worship of Humanity. The juxtaposition of these three may seem strange. Agnostics and Humanitarians are very superior people, who may perhaps resent being classed along with mere Christians. Some Christians, again, may think that if Agnostics and Humanitarians are to be called religious, they would prefer to stand out of the list.

Agnostics and Humanitarians, too, have sometimes a way of denying each other's right to be regarded as having a religion at all. And certainly it seems to me that, in these latter cases, the two elements of worship have been so completely severed from each other that reverence has become almost an impossibility. Neither "cosmic emotion" nor "enthusiasm of humanity" seems to be of itself sufficient for a religion. But it is just this abstract character, which these two religions possess, that makes them so instructive for our present purpose. What the Agnostic reverences, or thinks he ought to try to reverence, is the unknown power that is at work in all the processes of nature. What the Humanitarian reverences is the moral power that is at work in the history of human development. The Christian, on the other hand, reverences a power that is at work both in nature and in the moral life, a power that is at once known and unknown—known by its revelation in nature and in man, unknown in the fulness of its possibilities. His worship may thus be said to be a combination of the other two. Popular Christianity, indeed, does not present such a clear-cut outline as either Agnosticism or the Religion of Humanity. For while the agnostic religion is nothing else than the worship of the Unknown, and the religion of humanity is in its essence nothing else than the worship of the moral power in man (though it adds, on account of the hardness of men's hearts, an artificially fostered reverence for the earth, for space, and the like); popular Christianity, on the other hand, in combining these two elements, seems to combine along with them a great deal of what has been called "extra belief." Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that, if you omit from popular Christianity the merely dogmatic elements, on which the churches are divided, the merely sensational elements, which are differently apprehended by men of different temperaments, and the merely traditional elements, which have apparently no religious significance whatever; and if you consider only those great inspiring ideas on which the power of Christianity for so many centuries has rested, you will find that it is at bottom little, if anything, more than a combination of those two elements

which Agnosticism and Humanitarianism have taken apart. That it is so, indeed, is perhaps sufficiently apparent from the ease with which both agnostic and humanitarian writers—when they wish to commend themselves to men's minds by their relations to the broad movements of history—can represent themselves as simply carrying out with perfect clearness what is dimly contained in the teachings of Christianity. The Agnostics are able to appeal to the fact that what the Christian religion sets up for our reverence is the inexplicable power behind the world that we perceive, "of whom and through whom and to whom are all things;" and they may claim, and frequently do claim, that what they have done is simply to strip this inscrutable power of those anthropomorphic attributes with which the fears and hopes of men had clothed it. The Humanitarians, in like manner, may—and sometimes do—point out that the Christian religion has been essentially a moral force for the amelioration of mankind, that its strength has all along lain in a certain enthusiasm of philanthropy, which breaks down the barriers of class and race, and gives rise to new ideals of life and society; and they may hold that what Humanitarianism does is simply to make these ideals clearer, and to rest them on a more scientific basis. And it certainly seems to me that there is much truth in these contentions both of the Agnostics and of the Humanitarians—though perhaps they are not quite so scientific in their reconstructions of religion as they like to think themselves. But what is apt to be overlooked by each side is the fact that Christianity has from the first contained *both* these elements at once; and that it is largely by the combination of them that it has been able to achieve so far-reaching a success.

It is not, however, on Christianity in particular that I wish at present to speak, though I intend to return by and by to that subject. I desire rather, in the mean time, to point out that these two elements to which I have referred belong to the essence of all true religion. I am inclined to think—and I intend to recur to this point shortly—that they are brought out more clearly in Christianity than in any other form of religion that has ever been widely influential; and I think it is to that fact

very largely—though, I admit, partly also to more accidental circumstances—that Christianity has owed its remarkable prevalence and persistence throughout the history of the most cultured of modern nations. But in all religions worthy of the name I believe you will find that there is a more or less clear presence, though often hidden under strange disguises, of these two fundamental elements of which I have spoken—reverence for the power (or powers) from which all things flow, and reverence for the moral ideal.

Perhaps some of you may think that two of the expressions that I have just used,—“all true religions” and “all religions worthy of the name,”—are “question-begging phrases.” You may think that they afford me a convenient method of making my theory fit, by simply affirming that those religions to which it will not apply are not “true religions,” or are not “worthy of the name.” And I must confess that I cannot undertake to tell you beforehand what I mean by a true religion or by one worthy of the name, or indeed what I mean by religion at all. The very definition of the term is a vexed question, upon which I have no intention of entering. You must remember that in what I say to-night I am not on my oath, and that I do not pretend to enter into minute distinctions or subtle definitions. I must content myself with saying, broadly and roughly, that I endeavor to use the term “religion” in the sense in which it is commonly current, to denote certain beliefs, feelings, and ceremonials connected with those objects which are regarded as the highest and deepest with which it is possible for mankind to deal; and that, when I speak of a “true religion” or one “worthy of the name,” I mean a religion which is not simply founded on superstitious terror (for I think a religion must be a *reverence* and not merely a *fear*); I mean also a religion which is not simply a piece of poetic fancy or of philosophical theorizing, but one which large masses of men have carried with them into the ordinary affairs of life, which they have felt, in their soberest hours, to be as real as the sternest of life’s realities, which has served, at least in some considerable degree, to furnish them with strength in labor, ardor in progress, courage in difficulty, consolation in trouble,

or hope in death. Using the term with this large and somewhat vague interpretation, I intend to glance very cursorily* at some of the leading religions that have been current in the world, and to try to show in what sense the two elements to which I have referred have been present in them.

Let us begin, for instance, with the religion of the Greeks. The Greeks—*i.e.*, the Athenians, who are for us the typical Greeks—were not on the whole a nation of intensely earnest men, at least not in the sense of having strenuous moral convictions. Their life was, indeed, in its best days too free and happy for the intrusion of any such subduing presence. They had not that absorbing sense of the supreme importance of righteousness or justice, which is the key-note in the life of the Hebrews, nor had they even that stern recognition of law and order, to which at all costs the will of the individual must be subjected, which is so characteristic of the attitude of the Romans. The central element in the Greek consciousness was rather æsthetical than ethical. Artistic beauty stood with them on the whole for the highest that they knew. Even in their moral life, indeed, they were not conscious of any higher motive than that of the performance of what is right, as they said, “for the beauty of it,”—*τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*,—which is, no doubt, in a sense, the highest motive that is possible; but it is the highest motive expressed rather in an æsthetical than in an ethical form. Every Greek would have been ready to follow Mr. Ruskin in his identification of morality and taste; only, while Mr. Ruskin tends on the whole to regard taste as a particular exemplification of the moral law, a Greek might rather have regarded the moral law as a particular application of the principles of good taste. The worship of the Greeks also was the worship of beauty. It might seem, therefore, as if our very first instance went against the view that I am seeking to maintain. The reverence of the Greeks can hardly be said to have been directly a reverence either for natural power

* As here printed, this “glance” has become still more cursory than it was in the lecture as originally given. On the other hand, some slight additions have been made in other portions of the treatment.

or for the moral ideal;* it was rather the reverence for what is beautiful, whether in nature or in human life. Such an exception as this, however, is, I think, only of that kind which is said to confirm the general rule. For, in a sense, as I have already indicated, beauty *was* the moral ideal of the Greeks; it was the highest perception that they had; it was that for the sake of which, in its noblest forms, they conceived that everything else ought to be sacrificed. In a sense, also, they tended to identify beauty or harmony—as we see in most of their great philosophers—with the principle that is deepest and most powerful in nature. In their most developed thought it was nearly always supposed that it was some principle of order or harmony that ruled the world. Still, it must be allowed that, in its more popular forms at least, their worship was not primarily a reverence either for morality or for natural law. But observe further, that just for this reason the Greek religion betrayed its imperfection, and had to be supplemented from other sources. The gods of the Greeks were beautiful symbols of natural and moral forces; but they were not a complete expression either of that which is deepest or of that which is purest in life or in existence. Above the power of the gods, there was the power of Fate;† and above the beauty of the gods, there was the beauty of Justice and of Truth. It was necessary in the end that these deeper realities also should find recognition and reverence. And they did find recognition; though the recognition of them was at the same time the destruction of Greek religion, by bringing out its inherent incompleteness. In Greek tragedy—which is, I suppose, the highest expression of Greek religious feeling—the gods are overborne by Fate; and Plato, who was perhaps the most deeply religious of Greek philosophers, is forced to reject the stories of the gods in the interests of morality. And so it comes about that in the best religious thought of the Greek decline—that thought in which Greece seems to stretch out its hands towards Judæa—a moral power has distinctly taken

* Cf., on this point, Ziegler's "*Ethik der Griechen und Römer*," pp. 16, *et seq.*

† See Wescott's "*Religious Thought in the West*," p. 106.

the place of the ideal of beauty; and that power is recognized also as the strongest, or indeed as the only ultimate, force in nature.*

The Scandinavian divinities seem, so far as I can judge, to be mainly confined to the forces of nature rather than to the powers and ideals of the moral life. It was from this mythology that Carlyle selected his "Hero as God;" but as far as one can gather, even from the statements of Carlyle himself, it does not appear that hero-worship was the most prominent element in their religion. Their deities seem rather to be, for the most part, embodiments of those natural forces which, in a rough climate, and in the midst of wild scenery and modes of life, could not but impress themselves forcibly on the attention of the people. They seem also, to a large extent, to embody metaphysical principles of a rude and simple kind,—the idea of eternity, the continuity and organic nature of life, and so forth. On the whole, therefore, we must say that this religion is mainly concerned with the first of the two elements that I am trying to bring out. Nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that there is a distinct element of hero-worship contained in it in a subordinate way—indeed, in such gods as Woden, in a sufficiently prominent way—and that thus a certain moral ideal is also represented.

In most of the Eastern religions, on the other hand, as became a quieter and more meditative race, the moral qualities tend on the whole to predominate. At the same time, such moral qualities are frequently, if not even usually, thought of as lying at the very foundation of the natural order. The conflict of Ormuzd and Ahriman, for instance, in the Persian mythology, typifying evidently the battle of good with evil, is at the same time understood to sum up the whole struggle of light with darkness, of order with chaos, throughout the field of nature. In Buddhism, too, the ideal consists in the attainment of a certain peace which raises man alike

* Here followed, in the lecture as originally given, two paragraphs—one on Roman religion, and one on the general character of Greek and Roman religion as compared with that of most other peoples—which are now omitted for want of space.

above the warfare of the passions and the disturbance of the elements. It is primarily the worship of the moral ideal ; but it is an ideal which is conceived as being victorious over the troubles of the natural world, as elevating him who attains it above the confusions of the forces of nature, whether displayed without him or within him, "to where beyond these voices there is peace." It is thus a moral religion, but at the same time one which regards morality as strength, as a power which can give man the victory over nature, and raise him to a position of triumphant serenity.

Mohammedanism,* again, seems to start rather from the opposite side. It is primarily a worship of natural power. Its creed may almost be said to be distinctly that might is right, provided we understand by might the power which is ultimately deepest in nature,—which is identified with the will of Allah. At the same time, the will of Allah is, no doubt, usually regarded—implicitly or explicitly—as having a certain intrinsic rightness in itself, and thus as being a moral as well as a natural power.

But I suppose it must be granted that the religious people *par excellence* was the Jewish people ; and it is to their religion, accordingly, that we ought to turn with most hope of enlightenment. In this case, we may perceive from the first an intimate combination of the worship of the natural with that of the moral. No people, I suppose, ever had a firmer conviction than the Jews had, that right is might. This faith gives confidence and emphasis to the utterances of nearly all their prophets, among whom one feels almost tempted to include our modern Hebrew, Carlyle. Among the Jews, however,—and in this respect also the modern prophet must be, to some extent, included,—there was frequently a tendency to invert the relation between right and might. There was a tendency at least to regard obvious success as a proof of rightness, and misfortune as an evidence of sin.† For,

* Cf. Miss Cobbe's article on "The Two Religions," *Contemporary Review* for December, 1890, p. 844.

† I mean that there was this tendency among the people generally. I do not know that this charge can be brought home to their prophets. In the case of our

indeed, the Hebrew god, like the gods of many primitive nationalities, seems to have been primarily the god of battle, "the Lord of Hosts," and secondarily, perhaps, the god of thunder and of all other natural might. But in the deeper expressions of the Hebrew genius, in the finest passages of the prophets and the most poetic utterances of the Psalms, morality has the first place,—the moral law being sometimes set forth in its naked purity, with a directness and sublimity which has never been surpassed,—though there is a constant faith also that what is morally right is bound ultimately to become triumphant, together with a frequent sense of disappointment that it is not always obviously so.

It is, however, in the teaching of Christ that the religion of the Jews seems to receive its most perfect consummation. The exact nature of that teaching is, indeed, somewhat difficult to decipher, partly on account of the fragmentary nature of the statements in which it is expressed, partly on account of the questionable authenticity of the documents in which it is recorded, and partly because the early Christians came so early in contact with the thought of Greece and the organization of Rome, by which at last their own peculiar ideas were almost overwhelmed. Perhaps it has never been fully realized how much our modern Christianity is indebted to the Greeks and Romans. We usually think of it as essentially a Hebrew product, and this is, no doubt, fundamentally true. Yet perhaps if we inquired more fully into it we should find that in its more external aspects, at least,—by which also its inner spirit is very considerably modified,—it is almost as much a Greek product or a Roman one. With regard to the influence of Greek thought on Christianity, I may content myself here with a reference to the recently published "Hibbert Lectures" by the late Dr. Hatch, in which the whole subject is worked out in a very interesting and suggestive way. The influence of Roman organization is partly discussed in the same volume, and was wittily summed up long ago by

modern prophet, I think there is some evidence of an undue worship of effectiveness.

Hobbes, when he said * that the Church of the Middle Ages was essentially "the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof." And, of course, we must recognize also—especially in Protestant Christianity—the far-reaching influences of the Teutonic genius as well. How much, for instance, of the Christianity which long dominated the better mind of England is summed up in the sublime verse of Milton! And how much of that is but the perfect fruit of ideas which were fostered indeed in the sun of Greece and Rome, but which first blossomed in the Saxon imagination of Caedmon, and which were ripened in the gloom of puritanic struggles! And in countless other ways the Christianity of the modern world has been very strangely transformed indeed from the spirit that breathed in those winged words that were uttered on the hill-sides of Judæa, and that fired the hearts of that primitive ethical society that met in an upper room at Jerusalem. But so far as we can abstract from such transforming influences, and consider Christianity simply as it was in itself when it was first promulgated, I think it is not difficult to see that the essence of it lies in its being a complete carrying out of the Hebrew idea that right is might, and that this right and this might is that which ought alone to be worshipped.

Christ developed, in the first place, both by his doctrine and by his example, the Jewish conception of righteousness itself. He substituted love and self-devotion for the idea of a hard, external law, and thus placed morality at once on the highest basis. I am not, indeed, prepared to say that he gave the final expression of the moral ideal either in his teaching or in his life. His teaching seems to me, as I shall explain in a little, to be in some points too negative and individualistic; and his life also had perhaps, as Hegel put it, "the guilt of innocence" †,—*i.e.*, of withdrawal from the particular concerns of mankind. Still, it cannot be denied that it was at least a great advance on the moral conceptions that were current

* "Leviathan," iv. 47.

† See Caird's "Hegel." (Blackwood's "Philosophical Classics.")

among the Jews; and that both by his teaching and by his example (so far as we can judge of it from very imperfect evidence) he is likely to stand out pre-eminent to all time as by far the noblest and most characteristic of all "beautiful souls," the sublimest pattern of all the passive virtues, the eternal example of those who strive to keep themselves "unspotted from the world," and to remain faithful to the highest monitions of the "inner life." Whatever further we may *add* to the conception of the perfect life, that at least must be retained. By summing up in that short, intense life of self-devotion to the common good all that was highest in the fervor of Hebrew morality; by raising that morality to a white heat, till all that was narrow and intolerant and provincial in it was melted away in the fire of a universal philanthropy, he made the greatest contribution to *practical religion*—to religion as an ethical force—that perhaps any one man has ever made.

Again, Christ seems to have held with full conviction—what the Jews in general had at most only tried to persuade themselves—that the moral ideal is that which is alone ultimately victorious. It has, indeed, been often said, and not entirely without reason, that Christianity was at bottom pessimistic. Certainly, on the common interpretation of it at least, it does not hold out a very hopeful view with regard to the destiny of the great majority of mankind. And even with regard to the select few, it is only by pain and struggle that any good is to be achieved. Indeed, even pain and struggle may not always avail; for "many shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able." It is not without reason, therefore, that Christianity has been called by Goethe the Religion of Sorrow.* But yet at bottom there was a hopefulness in it

* Miss Cobbe, in her article in the *Contemporary Review* to which reference has already been made (p. 845), points out also that the worship of Christendom has tended to concentrate itself on that moment in the life of Christ (the crucifixion) in which his weakness is most apparent. Christianity might thus be thought to be in no sense a worship of might. But it must be remembered that this moment of supreme weakness has usually been regarded by the religious thought of Christendom as a moment of supreme triumph as well.

also. There was always a faith in it,—a faith which the founder of it himself seems to have confidently held,—that he who persisted to the end was secure of victory; and that, indeed, the sorrows and difficulties by the way were but the means of securing a more complete success. Bacon had ground, therefore, for saying * that, while “prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament, adversity is the blessing of the New.” Indeed, as Dr. Hatch points out,† there is often an almost offensive obtrusion—due largely to an individualistic point of view—of the trust that for all labor undertaken and suffering endured here, there are abundant “wages” in Heaven. But this is on the whole only a metaphorical way of expressing confidence in the final victory of right—a confidence which is expressed in the same way at the close of Goethe’s Masonic Hymn :

“ Here shall all fulness,
Ye valiant ! reward you ;
We bid you be hopeful.”‡

I may sum up, then, by saying that Christianity seems to me to embody most clearly the two elements of religion to which I have referred ; but that in all true religions they are more or less distinctly present. Religion, in fact, might almost be defined as the refuge of human feeling from the incompleteness of life. We demand poetic justice : we demand that the world of our experience should be a rounded whole, with reason as its ruler and love as its principle. We ask for a system, and we are disappointed and shocked because in our ordinary life we are presented only with a fragment. We ask for an intelligible world, and we are presented with a puzzle. Now, the central problem in the puzzle of life is the separation of power from goodness. As Shelley puts it in “Prometheus Unbound”—

* *Essays*, “Of Adversity.”

† “Hibbert Lectures,” p. 224. Cf., also Bosanquet’s “*Essays and Addresses*,” p. 109.

‡ On the Optimism of Christianity, I may refer here to “*Lux Mundi*,” p. 479.

"The good want power, but to shed idle tears;
The powerful goodness want—worse need for them."

The devil is the prince of this world, and the gods are crucified. That, we sometimes feel, is the summing up of the appearances of history. Wrong is might. Religion, then, is the faith that this appearance is not the ultimate truth; that the two great wants—the want of power on the part of goodness, and the want of goodness on the part of power—will prove in the end to be better abundantly supplied: the faith, in short, that the universe has a heart, or that the heart will find for itself a universe.* This faith has, I think, been the soul of all religions, or, at least, of the religions of all thoughtful peoples; but, most of all, it has been the soul of Christianity.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

(To be concluded in the next number.)

THE ETHICS OF HEGEL

A PLUNGE *in medias res* is not the current way in philosophical discussions. The introductory *orientation* is too often a porch out of all proportion to the building. The start is made with giving a *résumé* of Greek thought. Then an easy hop, skip, and jump brings us through early Christian thought and scholasticism to modern philosophy. From Descartes to Kant brings us to what has been considered the heart of modern philosophy. But we go on farther to see that the heart is greatly changed; that the centre has become an all-animating organic life; that subjectivism has become objectivism again, and that we are in a modernized Greek phase of thought. Kant, like Socrates, no longer represents any more than a phase of the larger concrete thought of the world. Seven-league boots would be needed to traverse the distance between

* Cf. Browning's "Epistle from Karshish:

"So, the All-Great were the All-Loving, too——
So, through the thunder comes a human voice
Saying, 'O heart I made, a heart beats here.'"